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Abstract 
Women’s rights are often curtailed online due to the pervasive internet atmosphere of 
cybermisogyny. Extreme examples include ‘image-based sexual abuse’, a term which 
encompasses the non-consensual creation and/or distribution of private sexual images. The 
harms attached to this phenomenon are well documented. In this paper, we explore how 
copyright logic, despite its male-centric and property oriented worldview, presents one legal 
solution to this problem. We assert that Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 
Takedown Notices, a copyright mechanism that notifies websites they are hosting infringing 
content and requires the prompt removal of the content, represents a novel legal mechanism 
to force websites to remove image-based sexual abuse from women’s online spaces. By using 
critical discourse analysis to review how DMCA Takedown Notices attempt to provide 
solutions to the socio-spatial problem of image-based sexual abuse, we argue that copyright 
can subvert its current leanings to return to its original purpose: supporting creativity. 
Supporting creativity also helps to protect against the reproduction of gendered harms, from 
the real world to virtual spaces. This theorization represents not just legal geography but a 
feminist legal geography, in that it recognizes the internet should be a safe and legal space for 
women. In endorsing a pragmatic legal solution for women to regulate the sexually violent 
and nonconsensual distribution of their intimate images online, copyright is one mechanism 










As one avenue for reclaiming the internet as a rightful space for women, we explore how 
copyright logic responds to misogynistic practices and spaces online. Copyright logic 
describes a host of international legislation and rules that seeks to balance the way people 
creatively express ideas, including the images in photographs and videos. It seeks to prevent 
others from copying, changing, selling or distributing expressed ideas without the permission 
of the creator. If someone distributes an image without the permission of the creator, the 
creator is entitled to civil remedies to prevent use and to seek compensation. Thus, while 
criminal and other civil sanctions are growing against this practice, they can be procedurally 
victimizing or inaccessible for women. We argue that copyright alternatively offers 
accessible and pragmatic legal alternatives for women to respond to the sexually violent and 
nonconsensual distribution of their intimate images online. Copyright, therefore, is a 
mechanism that affirms womens’ right to cyberspaces. 
However, Bartow (2006) explains how copyright is currently motivated by male-
centric and economic considerations, in so far as it is largely men who utilize copyright 
solutions to control and retain creative resources, even when these are collaborative processes 
of women. These power relations and priorities push women’s concerns, including ownership 
and control over private images to domestic and crucially, not legal, spaces. Still, as 
Bambauer (2013) first queried, subversive opportunities have arisen in the form of Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act Takedown Notices (henceforth, DMCA Takedown Notices).  
Centering our description around the experience of Leslie Jones and other celebrities, 
we explain how the internet is a socio-spatial environment that amplifies women’s 
experiences of misogyny offline. We argue how the nonconsensual distribution of women’s 
images is an important and timely legal feminist geographic issue which can benefit from 
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copyright’s activist potential for spatial justice online. We explore DMCA Takedown Notices 
as a novel copyright mechanism for securing women’s spatial sanctity, security, and agency. 
Using critical discourse analysis, we review 256 DMCA Takedown Notices filed by an 
American entertainment law firm on behalf of 22 celebrities, a potential digital 
wunderkammer to help women assert their right to sexual abuse free cyberspaces. We argue 
that these notices demonstrate how copyright logic, despite normatively relegating women to 
domestic sphere, still defends their right to exist in virtual spaces. Although the notices 
reflect normative male centric perspectives of privacy and domesticity, they still seek to 
subvert dominant paradigms to protect the images according to copyright’s original purpose: 
creativity. They therefore, borrowing from Lefebvre’s (1996) framework, have the 
potentiality to affirm women’s right to cyberspaces. 
In arguing that women might exercise their right to the internet through copyright 
interventions in favour of what we call cyberspatial justice, we use here Phillippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ (2014: i) definition of spatial justice as it pertains to the law, that is ‘spatial 
justice is the struggle of various bodies – human, natural, non-organic, technological – to 
occupy a certain space at a certain time’ (see also, Soja 2010). According to Phillippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos (2014:175), the only way in which law can generate justice: by withdrawing 
before the demands of justice while retaining its position as the main means in which justice 
can be achieved. This does not mean that spatial injustice of image-based sexual abuses do 
not also extend to real and tangible harms that go well beyond the internet into non-virtual 
spaces – they clearly do. Rather, we echo Bryce and Rutter’s (2003) observation that the 
socio-spatial aspects of the internet are complexly interpenetrated with social spaces offline. 
For, as geographers including Longhurst (2013: 122) have argued, ‘the internet is not a space 
that is separate or disconnected from the real world’; rather, as Madianou (2005) affirms, the 
internet changes and mediates the interactions individuals have with each other. 
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Part I. Spaces of Cybermisogyny in Celebrity Context 
 
When Leslie Jones took intimate photos of herself, she was entitled to privacy and dignity, 
which are established human rights. However, that was not what an anonymous troll was 
concerned with when they hacked her images and released them online for public 
observation. A comedian on Saturday Night Live, Jones was invited to star in the well-
received reboot of the 1980’s Ghostbusters film. The film was contentious because some fans 
of the series did not want the reboot to feature all women protagonists when the originals 
were all men (Gilbert, 2016). The backlash against Jones, the only black woman on the cast, 
was particularly fierce. In the summer of 2016, her active Twitter account was subject to a 
series of sexist and racist slurs. While she contemplated retreating from social media in 
response, the harassment increased. In August 2016, in a phenomenon described as ‘doxing’, 
anonymous trolls hacked her private information and uploaded it online. They shared scans 
of her passport and driver’s license. Even more intrusively, they released her personal 
intimate images. Gizmodo reported seeing ‘multiple nude photographs of Jones, and photos 
that appear to show the star engaging in sexual acts’ (Turton, 2016). In racist contrast, the 
trolls also uploaded a picture of Harambe, a gorilla who had recently been executed at the 
Cincinnati zoo when a child fell into its pen. Making good on her threat to withdraw from the 
online spaces, Leslie Jones took down her website and went silent on Twitter. 
This attempt to shame Jones publically with her private and intimate pictures isn’t 
new or unique. It is a form of gendered sexual abuse and harassment online that is prolific, 
accessible, and can come from any potential group, including former intimate partners, 
acquaintances, or in her case, anonymous trolls. Indeed, Jones was not the first celebrity to 
experience this abuse. In the summer of 2014, trolls released the names and photos of 60 
celebrities, including Jennifer Lawrence, Kate Upton, and Kirsten Dunst (Serna, 2016). 
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Further, quasi- and non- public figures have also experienced these invasions of privacy, 
including Canadian Judge Lori Douglas, whose superiors required her to submit to ongoing 
disciplinary hearings after her husband published intimate pictures of her without her 
permission (Puxley, 2016). This also includes vulnerable members of society, including the 
story of Amanda Todd, who was 15 years old when she exposed herself online to an 
anonymous user. When, as part of a campaign of harassment and extortion, that user 
circulated her topless picture, she was harassed extensively by her school community and 
eventually committed suicide (BBC, 2017).  
 
Demographic factors and celebrity focus 
This harassment of women online is of course not limited to image-based sexual abuse but is 
part of a larger cultural phenomenon that includes gendered, heterosexist and racialized 
stereotyping, objectification, condescension, mansplaining, doxing, and sexual assault and 
death threats. These various abuses have been well documented (Citron, 2014; LEAF, 2014). 
Further, while anyone can be the victim of image-based sexual abuse, there are clearly 
gendered dimensions as research shows that the majority of victims are women (Franks, 
2015; O’Connor, 2014) and the majority of perpetrators are men (Henry and Powell, 2016). 
Other demographic factors are at play as well. As McGlynn (2017:39) notes, men who do not 
conform to conventional masculine norms or stereotypes are at greater risk. People who 
identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual (LGB) are also at a higher risk: 17% of LGB American 
internet users have either had an image shared without their consent or have had someone 
threaten to share an image of them compared to 3% of heterosexual users (Lenart, Ybarra and 
Price-Feemey, 2016). One’s race or ethnicity is also a risk factor, with black American 
internet users having a 7% higher risk factor compared to 3% of white users (ibid.). To date, 
there does not appear to be robust data for trans and gender diverse internet users, people of 
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color, indigenous people, and people with disabilities; however, one can surmise their higher 
risk factor given that trans people, for example, report higher likelihoods of sexual 
harassment offline (Henry, Powell and Flynn, 2017). 
 Regarding the experience of women, LEAF (2014: 5) describes this online 
experiences of harassment as ‘cybermisogyny,’ which they explain: 
…encapsulates the diverse forms of gendered hatred, harassment, and abusive 
behavior directed towards women and girls online. It offers a more nuanced way of 
describing behaviors often lumped into the catch-all term ‘cyberbullying’ in 
mainstream discourse, a term which tends to erase the sexist, racist, homophobic, 
transphobic, and otherwise discriminatory nature of the behavior and ignores the 
context of power and marginalization in which it occurs. 
We embrace the use of the term cybermisogyny while not losing sight of terms like 
‘misogynoir’ which identifies the ‘particular brand of hatred directed at black women in 
American visual and popular culture’ (Bailey, 2010) including Leslie Jones.  
Despite the diverse demographic experiences of cybermisogyny outlined above, this 
paper focuses almost exclusively on celebrity women, a group which tends to be rich and 
privileged. The reasons are contextual and methodological: in a unique historical occurrence 
unfortunately referred to as ‘the Fappening’, a man identified as Ryan Collier uploaded over 
500 images of celebrities (nearly all women) that he had retrieved from their email and cloud 
storage accounts through hacking (Serna, 2016), resulting in 100s of copyright notices being 
released in response to the pictures. Because of the copyright notices filed as a result of these 
events, the majority of publically accessible data on the use of copyright to combat 
cybermisogyny is for the moment available from cases concerning celebrities. While we 
analyse a subset of these notices, we want to restate that the gendered aspects of online abuse 
are not limited to the celebrity demographic, and moreover, they are intersectional with race 
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and class. As Jones’ experience of white supremacy demonstrates, the release of her photos 
reveals intersectional factors that extend beyond gender discrimination into cybermisogyny. 
The uploaded photo of Harambe demonstrated it was not just that she was a woman in the 
reboot it was that she was a black woman. Her targeted harassment on the internet supports 
Daniels (2009a) assertion that, in addition to gender, race matters just as much online as off. 
It is also important to express that celebrity women, despite their relative power, are 
not shielded from culturally gendered messaging built around the release of their private and 
intimate images. As Poole (2013) notes, women whose conduct does not conform with 
traditionally gendered behavioral expectations can be exposed to ‘slut-shaming’, a cultural 
practice that seeks to shame them (see also Ringrose and Renold 2012). Thus, discourses 
which construct celebrities as victims of image-based sexual abuse do so in so far as 
celebrities do not express their sexuality publically. For those who do, Lawson (2017) has 
summarized public discourses which often suggest that the celebrities deserved their 
victimization. Thus, even for privileged celebrities, this abuse has required them to either 
dismiss their own sexuality or ‘be labeled as easy’ in normative discourse (Poole, 2013: 232).  
 
Part II. Image-based Sexual Abuse 
There are several names for the form of cybermisogynistic exclusion and forced 
objectification that trolls inflicted on Jones when they uploaded her private and intimate 
images into public online space without her consent. McGlynn and Rackley (2017) have 
conceptualized the term ‘image-based sexual abuse’ to capture the sexualized violence in the 
non-consensual creation and/or distribution of private sexual images. This term most 
effectively captures the behaviors and harms without being reduced to specific motivations. 
The phenomenon is also often termed ‘revenge porn’, which Beyens and Lievens (2016: 13) 
define this ‘as the act of distributing photos or videos depicting individuals in sexually 
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suggestive or explicit circumstances without consent’ (See also Dawkins 2015); Pitcher 
2015). However, the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative (n.d.) supports the term ‘Nonconsensual 
Pornography’ because, as was the case with Lori Douglas, intimate images aren’t always 
uploaded to extract revenge. Douglas’ spouse for example was not seeking revenge but 
titillation (Puxley, 2016), yet the effects were still devastating for Douglas. There are also 
financial motives when the victim is famous. For example, the model and actor Emily 
Ratajkowski had her private photos stolen by anonymous hackers in February 2017, who then 
tried to sell the images (The Toronto Sun, 2017). Ratajkowksi has denounced the 
unauthorized release of her intimate images as a violation of her dignity and privacy.  
Regardless of motive, or whether the attacker is known to the victim or not, the clear 
intent is to violate a person’s personal autonomy, dignity, and privacy in a sexualized way is 
a form of sexual assault (LEAF 2014: 13). Image-based sexual abuse situates the person 
distributing the images in a position of power, where they can maintain coercive control. 
Experts concur that such acts are grotesquely invasive. Indeed, Jennifer Lawrence also 
likened the release of her images to a sex crime: ‘It is not a scandal. It is a sex crime. It is a 
sexual violation…It's disgusting. The law needs to be changed, and we need to change’ 
(Kashner, 2014).  Similarly, Associate Chief Justice Douglas said of her disciplinary 
hearings, where panel members viewed the photos without her permission and questioned her 
on them, was like being sexually assaulted (Puxley, 2016): ‘It hurt, hurt, hurt, hurt, hurt like 
agony when I had to be interviewed by people who had looked at them’.  
Further, while many women are victimized by former intimate partners after the 
relationship terminates (Pitcher, 2015), anonymous hacking also makes women vulnerable to 
attacks. Hacking has often occurred when individual cloud accounts are targeted with ‘brute-
force’ attacks, i.e. program scripts that rapidly apply numerous password and username 
combinations until the correct sequence is located (Greenberg, 2014). Intimate images, which 
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may have been automatically saved to the cloud without the users’ knowledge, are then 
accessed by the hackers. When a pair of Kirsten Dunst’s photos were leaked, she sent a 
sarcastic Tweet ‘thank you’, not to the anonymous hacker, but to iCloud (Cohen et al., 2014). 
Cloud companies like Apple are ever scrambling to patch security holes accessed by hackers, 
including individual behavioral changes including encrypted two factor authentication 
processes as a further source of protection. However, in our rapidly evolving technologically 
mediated society, information online is vulnerable to exploitation. In the celebrity scandal 
including Jennifer Lawrence and others, Collier sent emails purporting to be from Apple and 
Google requesting usernames and passwords. He used this information to steal their photos 
(Serna, 2016).  
 
Other legal interventions and deficits of extant laws 
Copyright law, including DMCA Takedown Notices, offers a novel intervention into image-
based sexual abuse. In the last five years, legislators and enforcement officers have begun to 
take image-based sexual abuse more seriously. However, their focus has mainly been in the 
criminal law sphere. Dawkins (2015) and Franks (2016) itemize a host of  domestic and 
international laws along with domestic proposals for the criminalization of image-based 
sexual abuse. As of July 2017 in the United States, 38 States have laws that criminalize the 
distribution of intimate photographs (Franks, 2016). For example Florida criminalizes what it 
terms ‘sexual cyberharassment’ by giving a misdemeanor of First Degree, or a Felony of 
Third Degree for Second or Subsequent violations (Sexual cyberharassment, 2016). See also 
Texas, which describes the ‘Unlawful Disclosure or Promotion of Intimate Visual Material’ 
as a Class A Misdemeanor (Sexual cyberharassment, 2016).  
Criminal sanctions have also been applied using penal codes unrelated to image-based 
sexual abuse. Ryan Collier, who hacked into Jennifer Lawrence’s and other celebrity 
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accounts plead guilty to one count of gaining unauthorized access to a protected computer to 
obtain information. He was sentenced to 18 months in a federal US prison (Serna, 2016). 
Aydin Coban, who attacked Amanda Todd, was convicted in 2017 in the Netherlands for 
similar actions towards 34 young women and five young gay men (BBC, 2017). He was 
sentenced to 11 years and will be extradited to Canada to face Canadian charges related to 
Todd.  
Regarding Jones’ anonymous attacker, the Department of Homeland Security stated at 
the time of the attack that it was investigating the hack on an ongoing basis (Levin, 2016). 
This is an extraordinary measure; most victims of this crime do not receive the attention, 
resources or support of the Department of Homeland Security. That the Department became 
involved at all, however, suggests there is a growing level of awareness of the connections 
between image-based sexual abuse and a states’ interest in the bodily security of women.  
 
Copyright as a significant women-lead legal remedy 
Still, the effectiveness of criminalizing image-based sexual abuse varies from state to state. A 
particular critique has been raised by the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative (Initiative CCR, 2015: 
np) because ‘some revenge porn laws only punish the original perpetrator, but allow others to 
continue sharing the private images freely.’ Further, criminal laws are effective when the 
perpetrator is known and cannot assist when the attack comes from an anonymous third party.  
As in sexual assault trials, women too are put on trial (Hengehold 2000), where their voices 
are ‘enframed by the performative nature of legal procedure’ (Boyer 1996: 286). They are 
forced through expensive and lengthy procedural systems of law where the processural end-
game often leads to spatial injustice. The systemic justicial responses here seem less 
concerned with women being granted a right to cyberspaces free of sexual assault from the 
distribution of their images online, to disciplinary measures aimed at the perpetrators of this 
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distribution. Punitive law can further marginalize, oppress, and silence, especially for those 
without the material and authoritative voice (often men) to challenge the systemic power 
imbalances within law (Chouinard 1994).  
It is therefore important to have further legal recourse when criminal laws are 
ineffective. Copyright can offer a significant civil remedy here. Criminal laws are driven at 
the discretion of prosecutors, whereas civil remedies like copyright gives women agency and 
autonomy, and hence democratization, to lead their own cases (Barnett 2012). Copyright laws 
can also target third party hosts like websites, who distribute the photographs stolen from an 
anonymous party. Further, DMCA Takedown Notices are a relatively inexpensive and 
accessible legal intervention with websites even offering step-by-step instructions on how to 
submit a notice, opening the process to less economically advantaged people and further 
intersectional concerns around racism (Urban, Karaganis & Schofield 2016; Wright, 2017). 
By focusing on women’s legal social cyberspaces it allows us to explore their spatial 
practices but also to investigate how these cyberspaces are experienced and managed by 
various agents. Such an approach may reveal forms of oppression or discrimination that a 
punitive approach might disregard otherwise. 
 DMCA Takedown Notices are authorized by Section 512 of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (1988). The section requires hosting services including websites and social 
media sights, and search engines including Google, to respond expeditiously to notices of 
copyright infringement in DMCA Takedown Notices by removing hosted content. When a 
hosting site receives a notice, it must take down the material and notify the alleged infringer 
that material has been removed. DMCA Takedown Notices typically identify the alleged 
copyrighted and infringing work and information, contact information for the complaining 
party or their legal representative, and a statement that the complaining party believes in good 
faith that the use of the material is infringing. 
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Thus, while every legal measure taken against image-based sexual abuse are worth 
exploring, copyright offers the opportunity for a women-driving and relatively accessible 
civil law solution.  
 
Part III. Cyberspaces, Neutrality, and Safe Space Optimism  
For internet spaces online, we must acknowledge, as Parker et al. (2016: 3) have aptly 
observed that that ‘spaces are not neutral backgrounds. They are imbued with particular 
meanings and generate certain behaviors.’ In the non-neutral socio-spatial realms of the 
internet, intimate images circulate without the subject’s consent. Thus while the internet is 
clearly an amorphous structure; with some aspect/spaces being safe for certain people, as 
Jones’ and the others experience demonstrates, internet spaces can also be fora for 
particularly egregious forms of gender based violence. Indeed, they can amplify the same 
harassments women experience in non-internet spaces because of the capacity of online 
communications to reach a much more extensive audience that traditional communications 
technologies. 
Due to the complex interpenetrativeness of sociospaces online and off, the 
misogynistic invasion of women’s intimate sociospatial online forums, are arguably akin to 
an invasion in geospatial terms. ‘Interactions in cyberspace affect interactions in real space 
and vice versa’ (Longhurst, 2013: 122), because the internet is not a space that is separate or 
disconnected from the real world. Rather, on and offline spaces are inextricably linked (De 
Jong, 2015). Because ‘real space and cyberspace are both experienced through the body’ 
(Longhurst, 2013: 122), the use of Jones’ images can ‘have real effects, both bodily and 
physical’ on a woman, which are not tangential to how she experiences and lives her 
everyday life (Henry and Powell, 2015: 765).  
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When intimate images are uploaded online, the effects can be devastating. Franks 
(2015: 2) writes: 
In a matter of days, that image can dominate the first several pages of search engine 
results for the victim’s name, as well as being emailed or otherwise exhibited to the 
victim’s family, employers, co-workers, and peers. Victims are frequently threatened 
with sexual assault, stalked, harassed, fired from jobs, and forced to change schools. 
Some victims have committed suicide.  
McGlynn and Rackley (2017:534) note the loss of ‘dignity, privacy and sexual 
autonomy’, which ‘combine to constitute a form of cultural harm that impacts directly on 
individuals, as well as on society as a whole.’ Poole (2013: 232) writes that ‘the emotional 
harms caused by slut-shaming [including revenge porn] can follow a woman around for 
years, damage her self-perception, and possibly cause her either to dismiss her own sexuality 
or be labeled as easy.’ Amanda Todd described anxiety, panic attacks and depression in 
response to the knowledge that her intimate images were circulating on the internet (BBC, 
2017). Similarly, Jennifer Lawrence said, ‘I can't even describe to anybody what it feels like 
to have my naked body shoot across the world like a news flash against my will’ (Kashner, 
2014). This experience may be akin to what Longhurst & Balan (2003) describe as bodily 
abjection: when bodies are used as objects in a particular space, in this case the internet, they 
become both alluring and repellant as they negotiate spaces of social circulation. 
 Jones’ initial response to the release of her private and intimate images was socio-
spatial retreat by going silent online. Women before her have taken similar measures. See the 
experience of Kathy Sierra, a game developer and software programmer who retreated from 
online life when her images were modified with nooses next to her head (Hess, 2014). 
Similarly, the Guardian writer, Jessica Valenti, decided to take a break from social media 
after trolls threatened to rape and kill her five year old daughter (Chasmar, 2016). Valenti 
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tweeted ‘This morning I woke up to a rape and death threat directed at my 5-year-old 
daughter. That this is part of my work life is unacceptable.’ The retreat from public life 
behind the private divide reaffirms geographers such as Boyd’s (1997) description of a 
persistent and gendered divide between public and private spaces. Much as street harassment 
in public spaces acts as a form of discipline on women (Logan, 2015), and can effectively 
push them back into private spaces, so too has internet harassment pushed women offline. 
However, it should not be the responsibility of the victim to retreat; shifting any 
responsibility from the perpetrator onto the victim would simply perpetuate a culture of 
victim blaming. Nor is permanent retreat online a practical maneuver when our lives are so 
interlinked with online function. Ash, Kitchin, and Leszczynski  (2018) describe how the 
omnipresence of the internet in the spaces and practices of everyday life fosters a certain 
dependency.  
The spatial aspects of the internet are not just pervasive and dependent, as Madianou 
(2005) explains, virtual space can become a core component of our character, mediating our 
identities in almost inextricable ways. Leslie Jones is a stand-up comedian and so has 
arguably built her career in part due to her social media use. Therefore, while certain women 
have understandably retreated from life online, not only is it victim blaming to expect this, it 
is wholly impractical. In September 2016 Jones’ returned to Twitter, tweeting (Jones, 2016): 
‘Thanks to my fans and friends! I'm soooo ok really. And I will always be funny been 
through a lot in my life and I ALWAYS GET BACK UP’. This is a clear act of resistance 
from these women: resistance to the disciplining of their bodies online, resistance against 
being pushed out of the public sphere, and an unwillingness to be reduced to abject bodies 
online. 
Of course, this new form of disciplining of women online is not the affinity coalition 
that Donna Haraway originally and optimistically envisioned in her Manifesto (1991). 
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Haraway hoped that the new communication technologies leading to today’s internet would 
give people the agency to build coalitions based on shared interests. According to Haraway, 
these described affinity based coalitions would replace the extant tendency to group people 
based on reductive and socially constructed identity markers, including gender binaries. 
Instead there would be uniquely safe spaces online for women to congregate and share 
information and ideas without being reduced to or defined by their gender identity. 
Haraway’s vision was shared enthusiastically by other feminists including geographer Light 
(1995), who predicted that the internet specifically offered women a greater opportunity for 
self-expression. Plant (1996) also argued that computer-mediated communications might 
create potential new liberatory spaces. As Haraway before, Plant (1996) predicted opportune 
forums, which would blur the traditional distinctions between genders and remove associated 
constraints. Braidotti (1996) generally concurred, postulating that genderless opportunities 
would become available to women notwithstanding the gendered digital divide in access. 
That was the 1990s. Despite early optimism, and while acknowledging some spaces 
of the internet are not necessarily sites of misogyny and can have activist potential (Maclean 
and Maalsen 2013), academics including Franks (2011, 2015; 2012) describes how gendered 
harassment has not only undermined the progressive social potential of spaces online, the 
internet has actually served a medium for expanding and amplifying misogyny. Franks (2011, 
p.255) notes that:  
far from being the site of radical gender deconstruction, or a realm of sophisticated 
reflection on gender roles, or a world offering freedom from the forced objectification 
of women’s bodies, cyberspace instead has become a place (or rather, places) that 
work in tandem with and reinforces women’s unwilling embodiment. 
In other words, the structural inequalities and exclusions in offline spaces also have gendered 
expressions online (Daniels 2009b: 116).  
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Nonconsensual release of intimate images imposes on women what feminist work 
(Franks, 2011: 226) terms an ‘unwilling avatar’. Voluntary avatars are the self-
representations that people choose to share in cyberspaces include alternative social media 
and gaming aliases. A voluntary avatar includes the promotional image depicting Jones in a 
ghostbusting uniform that she chose to include on her Twitter account. Such willing avatars 
offer the opportunity to ‘escape physical limitations, both geographic and bodily’ (Franks, 
2011: 225). They represent a realization of Haraway’s optimism. The unwilling avatar, 
becomes a tool for male-centric objectification and ‘involves invoking individuals' real 
bodies for the purposes of threatening, defaming, or sexualizing them without consent’ 
(Franks, 2011: 255). This includes hacking into social media accounts or creating an online 
profile that purports to be the person in question. In Leslie Jones’ case, the sexually graphic 
avatar posted by trolls without her consent included racialized pejoratives. For Jones, her 
‘feminine body, constructed as aberrant sexual difference, becomes the conduit for 
gratification and objectification in both geospatial and sociospatial worlds’ (Henry & Powell, 
2015: 768). The negative effects on many involved celebrities were palpable; Jennifer 
Lawrence adeptly described her own experience, saying ‘It just makes me feel like a piece of 
meat that’s being passed around for a profit’ (Kashner, 2014). 
 
Part IV. Copyright’s Activist Potential for Women’s Safe Spaces Online 
One way to affirm socialspatial sanctity is to help build safe internet spaces for women 
through the application of copyright logic. In evaluating copyright’s evolving purpose and 
potential application to the sociospatial problem of image-based sexual abuse, we 
acknowledge Blomley’s (1994: 51) call for investigations that consider ‘the manner in which 
legal practice serves to produce space yet, in turn, is shaped by a sociospatial context.’ An 
investigation into copyright logic makes it clear that copyright practice both produces and is 
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shaped by masculine and economic considerations. While there are variations between legal 
jurisdictions, the definition provided by the US constitution broadly articulates copyright’s 
purpose:  
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8) 
Thus, the initial purpose of copyright was to encourage creativity by granting creators the 
right to control their science or art for a finite period. As copyright practice evolved, 
however, the normative focus ensured that economic as opposed to creative protections were 
prioritized for the owners of copyright. This effectively carved out copyright interests that 
weren’t economic. As Tushnet (2014: 2348) notes, ‘copyright works as incentive for 
economically motivated creators; it handles the non-economically motivated poorly.’ Bartow 
(2006) has argued this as well, observing that the works which receive the most court-
mandated protection are those that are the most commercially successful.  
Bartow (2006) also offers a gendered analysis, describing how masculine concepts of 
property drive the economic benefits inherent in intellectual property law (2006: 559): 
[C]ertain kinds of work, those best suited for industrial commoditization, have been 
heavily propertized, while other farms of arts and crafts, those that have been 
relegated to the domestic realm, are less often the subject of rigorous copyright 
protection or restriction. 
Bartow’s gendered critique echoes the ways in which feminist geographers such as Boyd 
(1997) have articulated the persistent divide between economic (traditionally masculine) and 
domestic (traditionally feminine) spaces. The priority placed on economic creations over 
domestic creations, is one reason copyright experts might be hesitant to argue for copyright 
solutions to image-based sexual abuse. If the works previously receiving strong copyright 
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protections from the courts received them only because they were a source of profit to 
powerful masculine and economic interests, then other copyright holders whose works take 
place in feminine or domestic spheres may be less likely to perceive their art as protectable or 
worthy of that protection. Works considered worthy might therefore be considered what 
Blomley (1994) describes as a co-constituted phenomenon between legal practice and the 
sociospatial context which prioritizes masculine and economic factors. The perception that 
the more profits a work brings in, the more likely it will receive full copyright protection 
means that as Bartow (2006: 559) notes: 
People who create things for noncommercial purposes may feel that copyright law has 
nothing positive to offer them. Though their works may be inherently vested with 
robust incipient copyright protections, without the will or ability to fund the legal 
activity necessary to enforce these copyrights, it may seem as if copyright protections 
barely exist at all. 
Those works would include feminine, non-economic productions, including private or 
intimate images, even if the images themselves go on to be circulated in public spheres for 
economic gain. 
Personhood theory further reveals how masculine and economic priorities complicate 
the potential of copyright to respond to image-based sexual abuse. Personhood theory is 
widely regarded as giving initial authors absolute, inalienable control over many aspects of 
their works. As Regan (2009) describes, personhood theory occupies a central place in 
copyright theory. However, a personhood theory of copyright law, intellectual property law, 
and indeed property law generally, has traditionally been based to exclude those who are not 
male, white, or heterosexual. As Hathcock (2017:239) observes ‘modern copyright continues 
to espouse antiquated ideals of acceptable cultural production, to the exclusion of the cultural 
property of many historically marginalized people groups.’ Hathcock (2017) goes on to 
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describe how not only feminine, but culturally queer, black and indigenous forms of work fall 
outside of the personhood protections constructed under copyright logic. Thus, while image-
based sexual abuse seeks to devalue the personhood of women through the capture and or 
release of intimate images without their consent, women might be pressed to seek solutions 
from copyright conventions which have also devalued the personhood of women through its 
normative male-centric and economically focused practices.  
Despite these concerns, we are seeing a debate unfold in the literature where certain 
academics see avenues for copyright recourse to image-based sexual abuse. Bambauer (2014) 
in particular leads this discussion and has promoted the option of using copyright to protect 
intimate images by recalling copyrights early and original purpose – protection of creativity 
irrespective of commercial value. He writes (2014: 2052):  
Copyright law holds considerable potential to address the promise and problems of 
intimate media. The task at hand— encouraging production of consensual media, 
while constraining sharing without permission—is precisely that for which 
intellectual property rules are designed. 
Bambauer argues that because of creativity, it is a normative ideal for copyright logic to 
produce and distribute intimate images on consensual terms. While intimate media is not an 
economic or masculine aspect of copyright’s creative ambit, it is the risk of non-consensual 
distribution, and the resultant reduction of creativity, which threatens that normative practice. 
Therefore, copyright protection would encourage normative creative output in keeping with 
copyrights original purposes. Adapting copyright law to protect intimate images is therefore 
appropriate to the way copyright has evolved to respond to the technological changes in 
image capture and creation and its concurrent novel expression of an idea. 
A significant critic of Bambauer’s ideas is Tushnet (2014), who expresses skepticism 
about copyright as a remedy on practical terms. Tushnet (2014: 2348) argues that 
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incentivizing intimacy cannot be compared to incentivizing the creativity within copyrights 
protection; thus ‘the motivations that induce people to create and share intimate images are 
unlikely to be affected by a change in copyright law, particularly one that both creators and 
abusive disseminators are extremely unlikely to understand’. Tushnet emphasizes copyright’s 
evolved economic purpose, saying that it provides no real mechanism for communicating its 
rules to the lay people experiencing infringing behavior in the manner that Jones, Lawrence, 
Douglas and Todd have experienced. Tushnet (2014: 2346) ultimately argues that there is a 
‘profound misfit between every aspect of copyright and the interests at issue with respect to 
stolen intimate images.’  
Practically speaking however, comprehension or communication of legal rules, or 
lack thereof, has not been a barrier to intellectual property legislation or many other laws in 
the past. One does not need to be a sophisticated party to understand the intricacies of legal 
requirements to be subject to them. Non-sophisticated proprietors of copyright infringing 
goods, for example, are still subject to financial penalties. See for example, the 2008 
Canadian awarded damages of $290,000 for selling counterfeit copies of copyrighted works 
in the case of Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. 486353 B.C. Ltd., 2008 BCSC 799. Indeed, lay 
people are typically engaged in the bulk of copyright infringing behavior – see for example 
the problem of peer-to-peer downloading of copyrighted media. 
However, Tushnet’s (2014) posited intractability of copyright to respond to women’s 
concerns over their unauthorized distribution of private images reflects a normative position 
in copyright law. As Delaney (2015) notes, contextual factors complicate how law develops. 
Developing a protective copyright response will necessarily push against gendered and 
economic norms built into copyright logic. Thus, when Tushnet (2014) argues that 
incentivizing intimacy cannot be compared to incentivizing creativity for copyright purposes, 
this argument may simply echo copyrights masculine and economic norms.  However, 
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forgiving copyright for reproducing masculinist and economic priorities for legal protection 
online only supports the sociospatial context from which copyright is both molded from and 
supportive of. Whereas mobilizing legal mechanisms that enable safe spaces online for 
women requires legal practice to produce feminist spaces by drawing from pockets of legal 
expertise. Therefore, much as feminist activism has resisted and reworked the constitutive 
problems of patriarchy and economic motivation, so too can copyright return from this trend 
of masculine and commercial protectionism to its original purpose: celebrating creativity. 
Creativity includes the right of women to safely produce intimate photos and keep them 
secure from hacking and dissemination online.  
As indicated below, we are now seeing non-economically motivated, feminine, and 
domestic interests lean on copyright logic to imbue internet spaces with safeguards against 
image-based sexual abuse in much the way Bambauer (2013) queried they might. The 
concerns attached to copyright logic therefore, which places masculine and economic 
interests at the centre, do not seem to apply here. Thus, while we recognize the arguments 
outlined above that copyright on the one hand is clearly a system of legal evaluation that does 
not tend to afford rights to anyone falling out of the white heterosexual, western, public, and 
economics-focused ambit, there are still signs that its normative barriers are being 
circumvented. 
Why is this happening? We might consider DMCA Takedown Notices together with 
the growing literature on feminist material culture studies for an explanation. Bambauer 
(2013) queried why people didn’t submit take down notifications under the US DMCA. The 
DMCA requires websites to quickly remove unlawful use of copyrighted images from their 
servers. Cooperating by removing material earns them a ‘safe harbor’ against further legal 
action. The safe harbor was originally designed for pirated TV shows, films and music. 
However, it is coincidentally well suited to image-based sexual abuse. According to strict 
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copyright logic, DMCA Takedown Notices should not be available to women if they did not 
take the intimate photo themselves, as they would not be the creator of the expressive work. 
However, research has estimated that up to 80% of nonconsensually distributed intimate 
images are taken by the subject as ‘selfies’ (Levendowski 2014: 62). This helps to fill legal 
gaps particularly in jurisdictions where efforts to criminalize nonconsensually distributed 
intimate media do so only for victims who have not taken the images themselves (Folderauer 
2015: 339). Despite copyright preference for a single ‘master mind,’ Bambauer (2014) argues 
that entitlements to co-ownership in situations of image based sexual abuse should be 
extended to the person captured in the photo as they are part of the creative process. While 
not tested in litigation, such a conclusion has historical precedent in the UK’s Fine Arts 
Copyright Act 1862, where the ‘subject of a photograph might be granted a right of control 
over the use to which the photograph was put’ (Richardson 2017: 63). Further, 
because DMCA Takedown Notices do not require that victims demonstrate their copyrights 
in the first instance, victims have filed even though they are not the authors in the strict sense.   
Regardless, as we will discuss in the next section, DMCA Takedown Notices have 
been filed in significant numbers on behalf of celebrity women with the potential to be 
accessibly and democratically normalized for women of non-celebrity status to pursue similar 
actions as these processes become legally streamlined, universalized, and systematic (Urban, 
Karaganis & Schofield 2016). 
We argue that this is occurring because there exists a sort of wunderkammer of 
cultural inclusivity here that is overriding economic, masculine, or paternalistic interests in 
copyright logic to provide workable solutions to image-based sexual abuse in manner that 
affirms the personhood of women (Bartlett and Henderson 2013). A wunderkammer, or 
cabinet of curiosities, was a renaissance aged cabinet used in to hold objects whose 
categorical boundaries have yet to be defined. It has been employed recently to house novel 
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concepts in feminist material culture studies and digital spaces where, for example, different 
values of masculine material cultures might interplay with feminine material culture (Goggin 
& Fowkes-Tobin 2009; Büscher, et al. 2010). Today we can already see an assemblage of 
actions with in the cultural wunderkammer, as both academics and legal practitioners are now 
resisting the confinement of copyright protections for economically motivated parties. A 
DMCA takedown notice is not as Tushnet (2014: 2348) argues a ‘concept of authorship-is 
normatively empty and can be filled any way we want to fill it.’ Rather, placed in the 
wunderkammer alongside image-based sexual abuse, it presents an opportunity to make 
personhood issues of personal autonomy, dignity, privacy accessible and even liberatory in 
the tradition of male centric copyright logic. Although stereotypical notions of masculinity 
and femininity have been naturalized and perpetuated within copyright logic, when women 
use DMCA Takedown Notices to confront imbalances, they are placing copyright logic 
tradition of wunderkammer serve to make. It places subversive kick to the gendered 
hierarchy in copyright which values economic output over domestic privacy and freedom for 
self-expression.  
 
Part V. A Discursive Review of DMCA Takedown Notices Filed for Celebrities  
Here, we review samples of 256 DMCA Takedown Notices sent to Google Inc. from Lavely 
& Singer, an American litigation corporation (Lumen, 2017). We use critical discourse 
analysis (Hirji, 2014) for deconstructing the type of language used in the notices. This 
method assesses biases that may be embedded within the discursive sample. It analyses 
‘opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power 
and control as manifested in language’ (Wodak, 2008: 10). We use this method to create a 
structure of meaning regarding women subjected to image-based sexual abuse, focusing less 
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on the specific, individual constructions and more on the patterns of construction or the 
availability of discourses as evidenced across a sample of texts (Sykes et al., 2004).  
Civil litigation is normatively private, making it very difficult to access legal 
documents between parties. However, we gathered the sampled DMCA Takedown Notices 
via the Lumen Takedown Project database, an independent 3rd party research project 
studying cease and desist letters concerning online content (Lumen, 2017), that acts for this 
project as a kind of Wunderkammer for feminist activism within cyberspaces. A project of 
the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, Lumen has 
constructed a database containing millions of cease and desist notices, including DMCA 
Takedown Notices. we selected notices if they referred to a prominent celebrity, and 
therefore retrieved 256 DMCA Takedown Notices samples referring to the following 22 
celebrities: Actors including Amber Heard, Jennifer Lawrence, Kate Upton, Kirsten Dunst, 
Yvonne Strahovski, Megan Boone, Meaghan Good, Rachel Nichols, Scarlett Johansson, Kat 
Dennings, Abigail Spencer, Vanessa Hudgens, Zoe Kazan, Blake Lively, Lake Bell and 
Krysten Ritter; the Olympian McKayla Maroney; Models including Carolyn Murphy and 
Emily Ratajkowski; Musicians including Travis Barker and Avril Lavigne; and Director and 
Screen Writer Christopher Landon. All of these celebrities have had private photos hacked 
and illegally posted online. There was no indication from the database that they represented 
Leslie Jones. 
 In lieu of NVivo, we used the multiple-field Lumen search engine. We searched for 
DMCA Takedown Notices filed from 3 January 2014 to 15 January 2017 (just before the 
mass theft of celebrity images up to the initial submission of this paper). This search revealed 
256 DMCA Takedown Notices, most of which were boilerplates. It was the specificity of 
language that was of was of most relevance and therefore each example below was selected 
for after discourse analysis of each of the 256 filed notices, from which we looked for unique 
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files. The keywords sorted for were: private; privacy; celebrity; nude; stolen; intentional; 
hacked; unauthorized; image; and photograph. We deconstructed the type of language used 
by assessing gendered sociocultural biases embedded within. We chose language that placed 
an emphasis on the public/private divide per Boyd (1997) and that, despite Bartow’s (2006) 
and Tushnet’s (2014) critiques, sought to protect domestic and non-commercial realms. We 
considered any language that argued for protection irrespective of the image’s profitability 
and highlighted Bambauer’s (2014) suggestion that using copyright protection promotes 
creativity. Some of the notices clearly relied on boilerplate arguments, i.e. the repetitive use 
of arguments for each individual complainant. The following five texts are notable (our 
emphasis in bold) of the kind of creativity potential within copyright. 
1. Jennifer Lawrence 
… We are litigation counsel for actress Jennifer Lawrence. Our client holds all rights, 
title, interest and copyright to certain private photographs, capturing herself in 
private moments in private locations (collectively, the "Photos"). We are writing 
with respect to our client's claims arising from repeat violations of copyright laws, 
and gross invasions of privacy, as relates to the unauthorized online posting, linking 
to, disseminating and/or publishing of the previously unpublished stolen copies of my 
client's copyright protected Photos by your service's users (the "User"). Unauthorized 
stolen copies of our client's previously unpublished private Photos appear at and are 
hosted and contained on your server and/or system (your "System")….(Lavely & 
Singer PC, n.d.) 
 
This notice for Lawrence argues for her rights to privacy under copyright law. It describes the 
release of her private photos as a ‘gross invasion.’ These lexical choices focused on 
defending Lawrence’s body as reserved for the domestic realm, which emphasized a 
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public/private divide. The choices push against the misogynist internet objectification that 
constructs women’s bodies as conduits for gratification. They also normatively afford 
copyright power to the nonindustrial and domestic realms of intimate photos. Male-centric 
influence is apparent given that the lexical emphasis on saving Lawrence from public 
exposure did not include a description of what Lawrence wanted herself, but instead 
constructed her body as private and therefore improper for public consumption. However, the 
intervention leans against the arguments of Tushnet (2014) and Bartow (2006) that copyright 
is motivated by male-centric and economic considerations.  
 
2. Kirsten Dunst 
We are litigation counsel for actress Kirsten Dunst. …THE ENTIRETY OF THE 
BLOG <CELEBRITYICLOUDHACKEDPHOTO.BLOGSPOT.COM> IS 
OPERATED FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF MASS COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT, SPECIFICALLY FOR THE INTENTIONAL AND KNOWING 
DISSEMINATION OF HACKED STOLEN PRIVATE NUDE/SEMI-NUDE 
PHOTOS OF CELEBRITIES, INCLUDING NUDE IMAGES OF UNDERAGE 
MINORS…. (Lavely & Singer PC, n.d.) 
 
Like Lawrence, this notice on behalf of Dunst reflects lexical choices focused on a right to 
privacy under copyright law. The lexical choices describe Dunst’s photos as ‘stolen private 
nude...images’ which again emphasizes that celebrity women’s nude bodies are necessarily 
private objects which must be restricted to the domestic realm through protections including 
copyright. While there is a focus on the intentions of the disseminators of the intimate images 
- see use of the terms ‘intentional and knowing’ - the desires of Dunst herself are not 
emphasized in the claim. Still, there is no articulated emphasis on economic motivation. 
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Dunst body is constructed a copyrightable artifact despite its relegation to the domestic 
realm. 
 
3. Amber Heard 
 
… The original works are previously unpublished, private photographs of AMBER 
HEARD … EVERY SINGLE IMAGE THAT APPEARS ON THE SUBMITTED 
LINK PAGE IS A STOLEN COPYRIGHT PROTECTED IMAGE. … (Lavely & 
Singer PC, n.d.) 
 
 
For Heard, the upper case discursive emphasis on stolen copyrighted image reflects strong 
protectionist and masculinist language of control and power. Implicit in the lexical choices 
are that Heard’s body is meant to be controlled for private and not public consumption. Such 
strong protectionist language troubles the arguments that male centric motivations are also 
economic motivations. It instead favours Bambauer’s argument that a normative ideal for 
copyright logic is intimate creativity through the production and distribution of intimate 
images.  
 
4. McKayla Maroney 
 
… We are litigation counsel for young Olympian McKayla Maroney. We have 
become aware of unauthorized copies of stolen private photos of our client, which 
capture her in a state of undress in private moments, taken while she was an 
underage minor … (Lavely & Singer PC, n.d.) 
 28 
 
Lexical choices were made by Lavely & Singer to portray Maroney’s experience as 
particularly egregious as her photos were disseminated as an underage minor. The emphasis 
on saving Maroney from unauthorized public exposure did not include a description of what 
Maroney herself wanted but rather constructed her body as improper for public consumption 
particularly because she was underage. 
 
5. Scarlett Johansson 
…A copy of a stolen highly personal and private copyright protected photograph 
(registered with the US Copyright Office) of our client Scarlett Johansson, in which 
she captures herself self-posing in the privacy of her own home in a state of undress 
and/or topless (the “Photo(s)”) ….  (Lavely & Singer PC, n.d.) 
 
Like the other samples, Johansson’s undressed body is described as necessarily private 
object, which copyright logic must work to keep safe within the domestic realm. Further, 
Johansson is still framed discursively as private; there is no normative shaming involved of 
their decisions to take the photographs. Rather, the emphasis is on her creative production, a 
copyrightable endeavor, which favours lexically the safety of women in their creative 
domestic endeavours.  
Reviewed together, the samples of the DMCA Takedown Notices show that the 
typical lexical choices included ‘private’, ‘gross invasion’, ‘privacy’, ‘protected’, and ‘state 
of undress’. These terms created the women’s bodies themselves as copyrighted property, a 
form of bodily abjection that is arguably male-centric. The terms focused on defending these 
women’s bodies as objects reserved for the domestic realm, particularly if the women were a 
minor (text that was consistently presented in uppercase). The emphasis on saving these 
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women from public exposure did not include a description of what the women themselves 
wanted but rather constructed their bodies as improper for public consumption, particularly if 
they were young. 
This description in these discursive samples of the women’s bodies as necessarily 
restricted to private or domestic realms, with no argument in favour of economic attributes of 
the images, troubles Bartow (2006) and Tushnet’s (2014) description of copyright law as 
male centric and economically motivated. While Bartow (2006) would surely agree that there 
is strong protectionist, masculine language of power and control, implying that women’s 
bodies are meant to be privately and not publically consumed, the patterns of constructed 
meaning here situate copyright as an appropriate mechanism for private and domestic 
disputes. They support Bambauer's (2013) assertion that copyright’s original purpose – 
creative expression – is an asset in of itself and independent of masculine economic 
motivations. Furthermore, while women are still framed discursively as private, there is no 
normative shaming involved of their decisions to take the photographs. Rather, the emphasis 
is maintaining safe virtual spaces for women online through legal processes as opposed to the 
punitive path of criminal law.  
The efficacy of this copyright mechanism remains unclear however, and does not 
disprove Bartow (2006) and Tushnet’s (2014) assertions that copyright protections are most 
easily afforded to economically motivated and commercially successful actors. The use of 
DMCA Takedown Notices for copyright infringements online generally has become 
normative; Google’s Transparency Report (2017) indicates that from Dec 14, 2016 to Jan 14, 
2017, 64 million URLs were removed. It is not a complete solution; new websites hosting the 
intimate images emerge just as others remove them. Yet research shows that the take down 
does result in decreased file availability in the short term (Lauinger et al., 2012). When 
websites become reputationally noteworthy for hosting copyright infringing material, this 
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arguably makes them more susceptible to blocking injunctions from the court, which 
precludes them from providing access to copyrighted material of litigants.  
There are also limitations to copyright logic as a path for the right to the internet. 
Civil legal remedies are typically slow and retroactive; the violence has already occurred. 
Moreover, they are often financially prohibitive mechanisms and unavailable to women who 
are not affluent or otherwise powerful celebrities. However, numerous sites are appearing 
online that describe relatively accessible steps for women themselves to rapidly draft and file 
DMCA Takedown Notices to websites (Quinn, 2009). Of course, for websites that refuse to 
take down the images in response to DMCA Takedown Notices, the next step is court 
litigation, a prohibitively expensive mechanism. Only four percent of law suits go to trial, so 
we have not yet been provided with a legal example of how this matter would resolve in 
court. Lavely & Singer threatened in 2014 to seek 100 million in damages from Google Inc. 
for Google’s lethargy in removing intimate media when it appeared online (Spangler, 2014). 
However, it appears no suit was ever filed, despite several of Lavely’s celebrity clients’ 
intimate photos still appearing in Google searches. Of note, we were not able to locate Leslie 
Jones’ private photos in a Google search. We suspect that between the 2014 and 2016, the 
time lapse between when Jennifer Lawrence and Leslie Jones’s photos were uploaded, 
Google Inc. has become more proficient in removing these images at the outset. The threat of 
copyright litigation has perhaps significant influence to shift cultural standards in allowing 
these images to proliferate. Thus, through a feminist legal geographic analytic, these cases 
illustrate how celebrities like Jones, but also women generally, can use copyright logic as a 
means to combat cybermisogyny and achieve spatial justice online. Our theorization 
therefore represents not simply a legal geography, but a feminist legal geography because we 
are demonstrating an ongoing struggle to create legal rights for women for their own bodily 




While we acknowledge that there is a paradoxical potential to copyright logic by using male-
centric legal remedies (and we recognize the limitations of copyright law especially in the 
cases where the image is taken by the abuser) in part can overcome these issues through 
material cultural interventions like wunderkammer: a subversive way to employ copyright 
law despite its male centric leanings (Bartlett A and Henderson 2013). Taking inspiration 
from the novel way DMCA Takedown Notices are used to protect non-consensually 
distributed intimate images, we might further search for ways to revamp copyright logic to 
reassert its original priority: protecting creativity. This priority would help women to exist 
bodily online unencumbered by gendered prejudice and cybermisogyny. The reassertion of 
copyright’s original purpose may therefore be a form of legal cyberspatial justice that will 
assist women to operate virtually according to their own perspectives and inclinations. This is 
not just a feminist geographic issue, but a feminist legal geographic issue: copyright logic can 
help women to claim the internet as a safe and legal space; it can help concretize their right to 
the internet. 
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